Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency, often called COIN, is the totality of actions used to defeat irregular forces. These irregular forces are usually called insurgents or revolutionaries.

While regular wars happen between different countries, counterinsurgency is often a state fighting a non-state adversary. This means the government is fighting a group within its own borders rather than another nation's army. During these conflicts, the line between a civilian and a combatant is often very blurred. This makes the nature of the fighting very complex and difficult to manage.

To understand counterinsurgency, one must first understand the mechanism of an insurgency. Insurgents look for social issues known as gaps. When these gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent. This environment allows the insurgent to operate and gain influence.

Counterinsurgency aims to bridge these gaps to remove the insurgent's support. To do this, governments use a combination of conventional military operations and other methods. These methods include political, economic, psychological, and civic actions. Some even use propaganda or psychological operations, known as Psy-ops, to demoralize the enemy.

There are different models for how these operations are carried out. Some approaches are "enemy-centric," meaning they focus on attacking the fighters directly. Others are "population-centric," meaning they focus on the people living in the area. For example, General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud used punitive raids called razzias in Algeria. These raids often targeted the agriculture that supported local groups. In contrast, modern doctrines often prefer the "oil spot" method. This method involves securing one area and then slowly expanding control to neighboring areas.

History shows that many theorists have tried to find the best way to win. In the 1700s, the third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado wrote about rebellions. He believed that a state rarely rises up without the fault of its governors. He argued for clemency and good governance to win the "heart and love" of the people. Later, David Galula, a French officer in the Algerian War, developed four laws. He argued that the aim is to gain population support rather than just controlling territory. He also stated that the population must be protected so they can cooperate without fear.

Other experts have provided different frameworks for success. In 1966, Robert Thompson argued that a government must be proactive. He said a government must have a clear political aim and follow the law. He also believed the priority should be defeating political subversion rather than just fighting guerrillas. In 2006, Dr. David Kilcullen proposed a framework called the "Three Pillars."

These pillars are Security, Political, and Economic. These pillars are supported by Information and aim to return a society to normality.

History also provides examples of why counterinsurgency is so difficult. B.H. Liddell Hart noted that insurgents have an inherent advantage over occupying forces. He used the French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic Wars as an example. While the French won most regular battles, the decentralized rebels sapped their morale. Another example is the Arab Revolt during World War I. Even though the Ottomans had a manpower advantage of 100 to 1, the Arabs could strike and disappear.

This allowed regular British forces to eventually finish the conflict.

Ultimately, the success of these efforts often depends on the relationship with the people. Martin van Creveld uses a metaphor to explain the difficulty of these wars. He compares a strong counterinsurgent fighting a small, weak insurgency to an adult fighting a child. He argues that a strong power using its strength against a weak one may act unjustly. This can make the fight feel unnecessary or wrong. Because of this, many attempts to deal with insurgency have ended in failure. The struggle often comes down to who can maintain legitimacy and control over time.